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AN INCOMPLETE DISCUSSION
OF “ARISING UNDER” JURISDICTION
David L. Shapiro*
INTRODUCTION
Dan Meltzer’s “luminous scholarship,” to quote from the dedication to
the recently published seventh edition of the Hart and Wechsler book on the
federal judicial system, has “enriched our field.”1 And so I am privileged to
participate in this symposium honoring that work, which covers almost four
decades and which ended much too soon.
Dan’s goal in his scholarship was not to deconstruct but to elevate. Doctrine and function, as he saw them, were not mutually exclusive or completely independent concepts. Each had an important role: the former to
provide legitimacy, coherence, stability, and predictability in the law; the latter to ensure that the law serves the practical needs of a complex and powerful federal judicial system. But neither should be considered apart from the
other. A major aim of his scholarship, then, was to bring those two concepts
into closer alignment.
There are many illustrations. Perhaps my favorite is an article he
coauthored with his friend and colleague, Richard Fallon, that focused on
the availability of remedies for constitutional violations.2 In that classic article, the effort to bring doctrine and function into closer alignment is beautifully captured in the following passage:
Within our constitutional tradition . . . the Marbury dictum [that there must
be a remedy for every right] reflects just one of two principles supporting
© 2016 David L. Shapiro. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Emeritus, Harvard Law School. My
thanks to Richard Fallon and John Manning for their very helpful suggestions and for their
invaluable friendship and support.
1 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, at iii (7th ed. 2015)
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER VII]. Richard Fallon, John Manning, and I wrote the dedication. Dan, whose work on the edition had been completed, died in May 2015, two
months before the book’s publication.
2 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991).
1931
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remedies for constitutional violations. Another principle, whose focus is
more structural, demands a system of constitutional remedies adequate to
keep government generally within the bounds of law. Both principles sometimes permit accommodation of competing interests, but in different ways.
The Marbury principle that calls for individually effective remediation can
sometimes be outweighed; the principle requiring an overall system of remedies that is effective in maintaining a regime of lawful government is more
unyielding in its own terms, but can tolerate the denial of particular remedies, and sometimes of individual redress.3

My purpose in this brief Essay is to expand on this theme as it played out
in Dan’s role as collaborator, friendly critic, and keen analyst, and to do so by
exploring a problem that in some ways lies at the heart of our elaborate system of judicial federalism, even though (perhaps because it does not arise
that often) it has received somewhat less attention than it deserves. That
problem addresses the nature of federal judicial authority—and especially
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court—when a federal issue is
embedded in, or when its determination may affect the resolution of, a question of state law. The story as told here begins with, and radiates out from, a
seventy-year-old decision of the Supreme Court, Standard Oil Co. of California
v. Johnson.4 I want to focus on its consideration over the years by Dan and
me, and on its effect on our thinking about related issues. This story, I think,
tells something not only about the fascination of the field we both enjoyed so
much, but also about both the delights of a long collaboration on a respected
book and the joys of colleagueship and dialogue. While the narrative deals
only with what ended up in print, beneath the surface lie many wonderful
conversations about this and related problems.
Telling the story requires some background and warrants a concluding
effort to bring my own thinking up to date.
I. THE STORY
Since the Standard Oil decision plays a central role, it deserves a summary at the outset.
California law imposed a tax, measured by gallonage sold, on the distribution of motor fuel. The law provided an exemption from tax for “any
motor vehicle fuel sold to the government of the United States or any department thereof for official use of said government.”5 Standard Oil sold gasoline to U.S. post exchanges in the state, and, after paying the tax, brought a
state court action to recover the payment on the grounds that (1) such sales
came within the quoted exemption as a matter of state law, and (2) if not, the
state law would impose a burden on instrumentalities of the United States in
violation of the Federal Constitution.6 Both contentions were rejected by the
3 Id. at 1778–79.
4 316 U.S. 481 (1942).
5 Id. at 482 (quoting California Motor Vehicle Fuel License Tax Act, 1923 Cal. Stat.
571, 574).
6 Id.
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state courts, and the Supreme Court granted an appeal under the statute
then in effect authorizing appeal as of right when the (federal) constitutionality of a state statute was challenged and upheld by the highest court of the
state.7
In an opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice Black did not reach the
second ground on which the challenge was based. In interpreting the state’s
law, Justice Black said, the state court “did not rely upon the law of California” but rather “upon its determination concerning the relationship between
post exchanges and the Government of the United States,” and that relationship “is controlled by federal law.”8 The opinion then went on to consider
the correctness of this “federal question” on which the state court’s interpretation of state law was said to rest, and concluded that it was incorrect:
“[P]ost exchanges as now operated are arms of the Government deemed by it
essential for the performance of governmental functions.”9
In his last paragraph, Justice Black wrote that the Court did not need to
reach the constitutional issue because it had no way of knowing how the state
court would have construed the state statute “if it had decided the issue of
legal status of post exchanges in accordance with this opinion.”10 Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and remanded “for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.”11 Shepardizing this decision reveals no subsequent judicial proceedings in the litigation.12
The Supreme Court’s ruling on the “state law” issue in Standard Oil has
continued to generate controversy. The decision might be viewed as at odds
with the rule of Murdock v. City of Memphis13—a rule I believe to be one of the
two essential pillars of American judicial federalism,14 and indeed one
required by our constitutional structure.15 Under that rule, the Supreme
Court has no authority to review a decision of a state court on a question of
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 344(a) (1940); Standard Oil, 316 U.S. at 483. Present law would
permit review only on writ of certiorari. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012).
8 Standard Oil, 316 U.S. at 483.
9 Id. at 483, 485.
10 Id. at 485.
11 Id.
12 A Shepardizing search on Lexis Advance of the Standard Oil case’s citation, 316 U.S.
481, conducted on March 23, 2016, yielded no subsequent judicial proceedings in the
litigation.
13 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
14 The other is exemplified by Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816),
which upheld the authority of the Supreme Court to reverse the judgment of a state court
on the basis that it rested on an incorrect decision of a question of federal law. See id. at
380–82.
15 Especially since the Court’s decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
For an excellent discussion, see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 499–506 (1954). I should note, though, that not everyone
agrees with me on the constitutional question. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 711–817 (1953).
The Murdock decision itself did not reach the constitutional issue; rather the Court’s decision rested on its interpretation of the governing statutory provision—the 1867 amend-
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state law—at least if that decision does not erect an improper barrier to the
Court’s consideration of a federal question.16 Surely, the California
Supreme Court’s interpretation of its own law did not stand in the way of
U.S. Supreme Court consideration of the petitioner’s constitutional claim;
instead, it precipitated that claim. Should it make any difference that in
deciding that state law question, the state supreme court chose to invoke
federal decisions in helping it to define the terms of the state statute?
***
Not surprisingly, the Hart and Wechsler book gave prominence to the
Standard Oil decision in the 1953 first edition, and continued to do so in four
succeeding editions. Although Dan joined the book for preparation of the
third edition, he did not acquire custody of the chapter on Supreme Court
review of state court decisions (Chapter V) until the fourth, published in
1996. To understand his contribution to the problem posed by Standard Oil
(and related problems), as well as the relationship between his thoughts on
these problems and mine, we need to consider the earlier editions, and two
related law review articles that appeared during that time.
In the first edition,17 the only one coauthored by Hart and Wechsler
themselves (and only by them), Standard Oil appeared in Chapter V, Section
2 (“The Relation Between State and Federal Law”) as a principal case,18 followed by a Note of some three and one-half pages entitled “Note on State
Incorporation by Reference of Federal Law.”19 In this Note, the authors20
referred to or described a number of other cases, asked how they related to
each other and to the Standard Oil decision, and asked whether the Supreme
Court would have jurisdiction to review a state court decision applying the
state rules of civil procedure if the state had chosen to conform those rules to
the federal rules. They also asked whether there was authority to review a
state court decision applying the state’s income tax law if the determination
of the tax was keyed to the determination of the taxpayer’s federal income
tax, and, finally, they noted a statement by Justice Holmes that the Court had
authority to review a state court ruling that “purport[ed] to deal only with
local law,” if it had “for its premise or necessary concomitant a cognizable
mistake [of federal law].”21
ment, 14 Stat. 385–87 (1867), to § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (1789). See
Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 614.
16 For in-depth consideration of the adequate and independent state ground doctrine,
see HART & WECHSLER VII, supra note 1, at 488–546.
17 HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM (1953) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER I].
18 Id. at 435, 447–49.
19 Id. at 450–53.
20 Unlike succeeding editions, the authors of this edition did not disclose which of
them had primary responsibility for particular chapters.
21 HART & WECHSLER I, supra note 17, at 453 (quoting Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 1, 11 (1907)).
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Two cases of continuing interest that the reader was asked to contrast
with each other and with Standard Oil were Minnesota v. National Tea Co.22
and State Tax Commission v. Van Cott.23 In National Tea, the Court was confronted with a state court decision that had upheld a taxpayer’s challenge to
imposition of a state tax. Concluding that there was “considerable uncertainty” as to whether and to what extent the state court had rested its decision
on the state or the Federal Constitution, the Court vacated the judgment and
remanded for clarification.24 In Van Cott, the state court, in determining
that certain wages paid by the federal government were immune from taxation under state law, appeared to rely on a U.S. Supreme Court decision
declaring certain wages to be constitutionally immune from state taxation.25
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, noted that the decision relied on by
the state court had just been overruled, and vacated and remanded so that
the case could be reconsidered “apart from any question of [Federal] Constitutional immunity.”26
Of particular interest here, the authors (perhaps motivated by a desire
to leave the task to students) made no effort in this Note to unpack the range
of cases they discussed, or to suggest—even through the use of their famous
rhetorical questions27—a possible synthesis.
***
During the twenty-year hiatus between publication of the first and second editions of Hart and Wechsler—towards the end of which the book teetered on the edge of obsolescence—at least one important article addressed
the specific problem posed by Standard Oil and similar cases: Ronald
Greene’s Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts.28 In this article, Greene
focused on the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in these “hybrid”
cases, giving a nod only in the last few pages to what he described as “this
nightmarishly confused jurisdictional tangle” that existed in determining the
scope of the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts.29 He
approached the appellate jurisdiction problem by breaking it down into
three categories. The first, “Accommodation to Federally Imposed Duties,”30
22 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
23 306 U.S. 511 (1939).
24 See Nat’l Tea, 309 U.S. at 555. On remand, the state court made explicit its conclusion that the tax violated the state constitution. Nat’l Tea Co. v. State, 294 N.W. 230
(Minn. 1940).
25 See Van Cott v. State Tax Comm’n, 79 P.2d 6, 14 (Utah 1938).
26 Van Cott, 306 U.S. at 515. On remand, the state court adhered to its prior interpretation of state law. Van Cott v. State Tax Comm’n, 96 P.2d 740, 741 (Utah 1939).
27 An apocryphal story about Henry Hart has him looking out the window of his office
on a sunny, cloudless day and saying to a visitor, “It is clear, is it not?”
28 See generally Ronald J. Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 HARV. L. REV.
289 (1969).
29 See id. at 322.
30 See id. at 296.
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centered on cases in which the state had chosen to use federal law as a basis
for providing a state remedy that was neither preempted nor required by
federal law.31 In his view, Supreme Court review of the state’s interpretation
of its law was justified by a federal interest only when there was a discernible
need to coordinate the state and federal systems on the issue in question.32
This test would clearly exclude a state’s reliance, in interpreting its own procedural rules, on the federal interpretation of substantially identical federal
procedural rules.
Greene’s second category embraced cases in which the state had
decided to interpret its own law on the basis of its understanding of a limit
imposed by federal law—as in Van Cott; in such a case, he argued that at least
if the state’s reliance on the federal limitation is clear, federal review is
authorized.33 And Greene’s final category—one he described as “Mandatory
Incorporation of Federal Standards”34—consisted of cases in which federal
law compels the state to afford a state law remedy.35 His prime example was
Ward v. Board of County Commissioners,36 one of the stars in the federal courts
firmament.37 My own understanding of that case is that it requires the state
to afford a federal remedy, though it allows certain state law defenses to be
asserted. But in any event, assuming that Greene’s characterization is more
accurate, the availability of Supreme Court review seems so clear that the case
can hardly be considered part of the problem.
In his last section on appellate jurisdiction, using Standard Oil as a whipping boy, Greene raised the question whether all hybrid state law cases fall
within Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction and concluded that to classify
them as doing so would run afoul of the Murdock rule.38 After mischaracterizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Standard Oil as holding that sales to
U.S. Army post exchanges were “entitled to an exemption under California
law,”39 Greene argued that federal review should be unavailable because any
use of federal law by the state court “was solely for the convenience of the
state and was not necessary to coordinate coextensive obligations under state
and federal law.”40
In his conclusion, Greene summarized his proposed test as authorizing
appellate jurisdiction “if and only if federal law of its own force is either actu31 See id. at 297–301.
32 And, he concluded, the need would also extend to a case in which there was a
similar interest in coordination in the context of federal law made applicable to a private
agreement. See id. at 305–09.
33 See id. at 309–15.
34 Id. at 315.
35 See id. at 315–19.
36 253 U.S. 17 (1920).
37 See id. at 24–25 (holding that due process required the state to provide a meaningful remedy for the return of taxes coercively collected in violation of federal law).
38 See Greene, supra note 28, at 319–22.
39 Id. at 320–21.
40 Id. at 321.
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ally or potentially regulative of the conduct which gave rise to the suit.”41 I
find this test puzzling for two related reasons. First, it seems hard to square
with some of Greene’s earlier discussion. And second, since the question
whether the post exchange in Standard Oil was itself a federal instrumentality
might ultimately be critical in determining the constitutionality of imposing a
tax on sales made to it, I don’t understand why the case doesn’t meet the
requirements of the test.
***
Three newcomers joined Herbert Wechsler in the (1973) second edition
of Hart and Wechsler,42 and Paul Mishkin took charge of Chapter V.43 Standard Oil remained as a principal case. The following Note—with a few words
added to the title so that it read “Note on State Incorporation of or Reference to Federal Law”44—was similar to that in the first edition but was
expanded to cover some new cases and the Greene article. (The Note
described Greene’s test as “incisive” and asked the reader to evaluate
Greene’s application of the test to private agreements.45)
One recent case of particular interest reported in the Note was California
v. Byers.46 In that case, the state supreme court had interpreted its own statute—requiring a driver involved in an accident to stop and identify himself—
not to permit use of the information in a subsequent criminal prosecution, as
(the court thought) such use would violate the Fifth Amendment.47 The
Supreme Court, without discussing its jurisdiction, granted certiorari,
reversed, and remanded, holding that the state court erred in believing that
the subsequent use would violate the U.S. Constitution.48 “Was the court’s
jurisdiction to decide the self-incrimination question clear?” the Note
asked.49
As with its predecessor in the first edition, this Note made little or no
effort to break down the problem analytically, or to offer any synthesis. But
in the later chapter on the original federal-question jurisdiction of the district courts (then Chapter VII), Mishkin (also in charge of the relevant section of that chapter50), made a new connection between Standard Oil and the
41 Id. at 326.
42 See generally PAUL M. BATOR, PAUL J. MISHKIN, DAVID L. SHAPIRO & HERBERT WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER II].
43 See id. at xvii.
44 Id. at 485.
45 Id. at 489.
46 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
47 See id. at 425–26.
48 See id. at 434.
49 HART & WECHSLER II, supra note 42, at 488.
50 See id. at xvii.
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iconic case Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.51 Mishkin asked whether the
Supreme Court would have had appellate jurisdiction if the action had been
brought in the state courts and the plaintiff had obtained the relief sought,
and then asked, “Is this question the same as that in Standard Oil?”52
***
Before the appearance of the third edition of Hart and Wechsler, I published an article entitled Jurisdiction and Discretion.53 As the title suggests, my
thesis was that the notion of principled discretion was inherent in grants of
subject-matter jurisdiction, unless the grant itself carried with it a mandate to
limit or eliminate that discretion (or to expand it).54 I argued that the existence of such discretion was not only well-established but also normatively
desirable, and that it could be found both in the discretion not to accept
jurisdiction when it admittedly existed, and in the discretion to determine
the scope of jurisdiction itself.55 In the former category, I included such
topics as equitable discretion,56 other forms of abstention,57 and the doctrines of forum non conveniens58 and exhaustion of remedies.59 In the latter category, I surveyed the original and appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as well as the original jurisdiction of the federal district
courts.60
With respect to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, after
discussion of the certiorari power, the tradition of dismissing appeals “for
lack of a substantial federal question,”61 and the Court’s history of declining
to decide many questions certified to it by a lower federal court, I turned to
the “hybrid” cases that are the subject of this Essay.62 Decisions that seemed
inconsistent could, I argued, be reconciled if the nature of the Court’s discretion was taken into account. Thus, Standard Oil was consistent with a case
like Miller’s Executors v. Swann,63 in which the Court had rejected its appellate
jurisdiction to consider a question of federal law embedded in the state law
question of a railroad’s power to convey certain property. In my view:
51 255 U.S. 180 (1921) (upholding district court federal-question jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought under state law by a bank shareholder to enjoin the bank from investing
in certain federal bonds on the grounds that (a) the bonds had been issued pursuant to an
unconstitutional federal statute, and (b) they therefore were not a “lawful investment”
under the governing state law).
52 HART & WECHSLER II, supra note 42, at 886.
53 David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
54 See id. at 545.
55 See id. at 546–47.
56 See id. at 548–49.
57 See id. at 550–52.
58 See id. at 555–57.
59 See id. at 557–59.
60 See id. at 560–70.
61 Id. at 566.
62 See id. at 566–70.
63 150 U.S. 132 (1893).
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[T]he Court . . . has recognized an implicit power to choose whether to
regard the case as one “arising under” federal law. This power to choose is
not unlimited or unprincipled; rather, the strength of the federal interest
guides the Court’s choice. In Standard Oil, federal money was at risk and the
federal interest in immunity from taxation arguably did not stop at the border established by the Constitution itself; thus it was appropriate for the
Supreme Court to correct a state court misunderstanding that inadvertently
may have pushed the state too close to that border. In Miller’s Executors, on
the other hand, neither the federal fisc nor a federal program was at stake,
and there was little basis for federal concern with a state decision holding
that the railroad lacked power to convey as a matter of state law.64

In a section addressing the original jurisdiction of the federal district
courts, I made a similar argument with respect to cases like Smith.65 At
another point, I commented in a footnote that the discretion I observed and
supported existed at all judicial levels, though it may well be broader at the
level of our highest court.66
***
Dan joined as a coauthor in the third edition of Hart and Wechsler,67
but the responsibility for Chapter V fell to Paul Bator.68 In that chapter,
Standard Oil remained a principal case, and the following Note, with the
same title, was significantly updated but, in general, similar to its predecessor.
My article, and the standard proposed in it, was cited without comment.69
In the fourth edition,70 Dan’s assignment, covering four chapters and a
major portion of a fifth, included Chapter V.71 Dan decided to substitute
Van Cott for Standard Oil as a principal case, and then dealt with Standard Oil
in the following Note, which retained its old title but was thoroughly reformulated.72 It began with a numbered “Paragraph”73 entitled “Compelled
Incorporation of Federal Law,” in which Dan drew an analogy between (a)
the state court’s decision interpreting state law on the basis of its understand64 Shapiro, supra note 53, at 565 (footnote omitted).
65 See id. at 569–70. For a brief statement of the holding of Smith, see supra note 51
and accompanying text.
66 Shapiro, supra note 53, at 578 n.214.
67 PAUL M. BATOR, DANIEL J. MELTZER, PAUL J. MISHKIN & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART &
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, at xvii (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER III].
68 See id. at xxiii.
69 See id. at 561.
70 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER IV].
71 See id. at vii.
72 See id. at 546–52.
73 The book has always referred to the numbered sections of its notes as “Paragraphs,”
even though they generally consist of more than one paragraph and are sometimes themselves subdivided into lettered subparagraphs.
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ing of the limits imposed by federal law, and (b) a state court decision that
federal law itself directly imposed the limit on the state.74 If the latter case
was clearly appropriate for Supreme Court review, he asked, shouldn’t the
former also be reviewable—even if on remand the state court might decide
to reach the same result without regard to federal law?75 After making this
point, the Note went on in Paragraph (2) to discuss the result on remand in
Van Cott, and in Paragraph (3) to discuss other, similar examples of “Compelled Incorporation of Federal Law,”76 including California v. Byers.77
Then, in Paragraph (4), Dan turned to what he called “Gratuitous Incorporation of Federal Law,” illustrated by such examples as a state’s decision to
follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their interpretation by the
federal courts, and asked forcefully whether these cases were different from
his first category in that “federal law applies only because the state chose to
incorporate it.”78 There followed a Paragraph entitled “Gratuitous Incorporation of Federal Duties,” exemplified by a state’s decision to afford a private
remedy for violation of a federal statute for which there was no federal private remedy, but which neither prohibited nor required the state to afford
such a remedy.79 He asked probing questions about the value of federal
review given the fact that the state was free either to deny a remedy altogether or to base the same remedy entirely on state law. In the last of these
questions, he asked whether review might be justified by a desire to achieve
uniformity in the interpretation of federal law.80 (My own thought, in
response, was that this desire made practical sense, at least in a case in which
the state may have interpreted the federal law to reach too far in regulating
or prohibiting conduct and thus had created a danger that the federal law
would be “over-enforced.” Admittedly, though, this reasoning assumed that
the state would not choose to provide a remedy for such conduct in the
absence of federal law.81)
Dan then turned to the Standard Oil case, which he evidently viewed as
not falling readily into any of his previous categories, and in asking the
reader what purpose was served by federal review, pressed the question further by asking whether the federal nature of the question considered by the
Court was “a kind of brooding omnipresence in the sky,” and if not, just what
provision of federal law was at stake.82 In response to my argument that
there was a federal interest in saving federal money even if the expenditure
was not barred by the Constitution, he asked: “But what [interest] gives the
74 See HART & WECHSLER IV, supra note 70, at 546.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 546.
77 See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
78 HART & WECHSLER IV, supra note 70, at 548.
79 See id.
80 See id. at 548–49.
81 See id. at 550 & n.6 (citing my thoughts); see also Shapiro, supra note 53, at 565.
82 HART & WECHSLER IV, supra note 70, at 549–50.
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Supreme Court authority to strike down state actions that come close to, but
admittedly have not transgressed, constitutional borders?”83
In a final, brief Paragraph entitled “Questions about State Incorporation
of Federal Law,” Dan asked a series of tough questions in search of a principled basis for concluding that “some but not all cases of gratuitous incorporation” fall within the Supreme Court’s appellate authority.84 And in a
fascinating parting shot, after noting that what was an appeal as of right in
Standard Oil would now be reviewable only if the Court, in its discretion,
decided to grant a writ of certiorari,85 Dan asked whether it might be simpler
to “provide that jurisdiction under § 1257 extends to every case of state incorporation of federal law, compelled or gratuitous—leaving it to the Court’s
case-by-case discretion whether to grant certiorari?”86
Though I take issue with some of the points made, I find it hard to overstate Dan’s contribution in this brief Note—despite its being only one small
section of a substantial chapter that itself was only one of several chapters for
which Dan was responsible, in a book designed in significant part not to
resolve issues but to provoke thought. The Note, I believe, made at least four
valuable contributions to the conversation about the “embedded federal
question” as it relates to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. First, it
unpacked the problem analytically more successfully than ever before. The
appearance of headings for each numbered “Paragraph”—a practice not in
general use in earlier editions and one that Dan successfully persuaded his
collaborators to adopt in the fourth edition and thereafter—helped in that
effort. Moreover, the practice forced each of us in our own work on the
book to think through our analyses much more carefully (and aided all users
of the book in the process).
Second, with respect to the Standard Oil case itself, Dan asked a question
that had been virtually ignored until then: In the absence of a relevant federal statute, exactly what “federal law” was the Court talking about? Whatever
the answer to Dan’s question, it needed to be considered.
Third—a matter again related to Standard Oil but one having broader
implications—Dan forcefully challenged my claim that there was a federal
interest in resolution of the state law question apart from the constitutionality of the state’s exercise of its taxing power. On what basis could there be a
federal interest in preventing the state from collecting revenue that it was
lawfully entitled to collect? The question is reminiscent of one I used to ask
83 Id. at 550. In partial defense of my argument, the Supreme Court did not “strike
down” the state action, but rather remanded for reconsideration in light of the Court’s
decision. See Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 485 (1942).
84 HART & WECHSLER IV, supra note 70, at 550.
85 In 1988, Congress virtually eliminated appeals as of right, and eliminated them
entirely in cases coming from state courts. See 102 Stat. 662 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257).
86 HART & WECHSLER IV, supra note 70, at 551. I am not sure whether or not, in using
the word “provide,” Dan felt that a statutory amendment was required to achieve this
result.
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my students when talking of Justice Brennan’s reference, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.,87 to a “federal policy favoring jury decisions of
disputed fact questions.”88 Since the plain implication of his opinion was
that this policy extended beyond the reach of the jury trial guarantee in the
Seventh Amendment,89 I pressed the question what the source of the policy
could be (aside from the personal preferences of the Justices themselves).
More broadly, Dan’s question invoked the ongoing debate about whether
federal constitutional and statutory law can or should have a “penumbral”
effect beyond its boundaries.
Finally, and in some ways most interesting, Dan’s last comment in this
Note brought the Court’s certiorari power—broadened in 1988 to cover
almost all of its appellate jurisdiction—to bear on the problem. No one
seemed to have noticed before that Standard Oil, and some of the other relevant cases, had come before the Court not as a result of the exercise of its
discretion but as a matter of the appellant’s right of appeal. Given the later
statutory grant to the Court of absolute discretion to determine whether or
not to review a federal question determined by a state court, Dan wondered
why the Court should not have authority to consider any embedded federal
question that may have affected the outcome, leaving the determination in
particular instances to the Court’s natural self-interest in limiting its plenary
docket to cases that matter.90
What is especially notable about these contributions is how closely they
fit into what I see as Dan’s broader vision of his goal as a scholar. Doctrine
and function each have independent value, but the more they can be
brought into alignment, the better.
***
The role of the remaining editions of Hart and Wechsler in this story—
as it relates to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction—is a small one,
most of which can be summarized in a footnote.91 But Dan’s role in the
87 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958).
88 Id.
89 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
90 I am reminded of a cartoon in which one Supreme Court Justice leans over to
another during an oral argument and says, “Her landlord kicked her cat! How did this
thing ever get out of Small Claims Court?” Everett Opie, NEW YORKER, Sept. 30, 1967.
91 In the fifth edition, Dan remained in charge of Chapter V, and the treatment of the
embedded state law question was quite similar to that in HART & WECHSLER IV, supra note
70, except that (1) a new opening Paragraph put the certiorari point at the beginning of
the discussion, and (2) the Note took account of the Court’s decision in Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986) (holding, in a federal court
action brought under state tort law to obtain relief on the basis of the violation of a federal
statute, that the federal district court lacked original federal-question jurisdiction, but stating, in dictum, that the Supreme Court would have appellate jurisdiction to review a state
court decision in such a case). See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, at viii,
518–23 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER V]. In the sixth edition, John Man-
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conversation also includes a later article of his in which he critiqued my
approach—an article he titled Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited.92 In this
critique, Dan agreed with my general thesis, endorsed my reliance on the
existence of judicial expertise in matters jurisdictional, and ended his
appraisal with the statement that as between imperfect alternatives, “I think
Shapiro’s argument that a robust judicial role [in dealing with issues of subject-matter jurisdiction] is to be preferred remains entirely convincing.”93
Indeed, Dan’s analysis was so thoughtful that he was able to find more depth
and insight in my article than I had been aware of—a result, I believe, of
Dan’s own analytical strength.
But the bed was not all so rosy. Several of the examples that in my view
involved a sound exercise of judicial discretion were criticized, and on the
topic of this Essay—the embedded federal question—Dan’s criticism focused
not on the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but on the original
jurisdiction of the federal district courts. On this issue, he was concerned
that I had over-indulged in the tendency of academics to favor complexity
and had evinced an excessive faith in the wisdom of judges to make sound
choices. Noting the extraordinarily high rate of reversal by federal appellate
courts of district court determinations of jurisdiction in such cases,94 he concluded that even though a more inflexible rule would probably lead to some
unfortunate results, a test based on the extent of the federal interest and
other factors was probably not worth the heavy costs in predictability and
ning replaced Dan in authoring Chapter V, while Dan moved on to other responsibilities.
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART &
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, at viii (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER VI]. As part of the increased interest in the Court’s treatment of
ambiguous state court opinions, precipitated by the Court’s decision in Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the more specific problem of the embedded state question was relegated to a single numbered Paragraph at the end of a Note entitled “Note on Ambiguous
State Decisions and Techniques for Clarifying Them.” HART & WECHSLER VI, supra, at
474–80. Several cases were cited and discussed, as well as the articles by Greene and me,
but Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942), was not mentioned. Treatment in the
recently published seventh edition was essentially the same, except for the additional citation in a footnote of several cases, including one (Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering,
P.C., 467 U.S. 138 (1984)) that, in reviewing an embedded federal question, cited Standard
Oil for the proposition that the Court had appellate jurisdiction to review a state decision
construing a state statute broadly in the belief that federal law supported such a construction. Three Affiliated Tribes, 467 U.S. at 152 (“[T]he state court may construe state law
broadly in the belief that federal law poses no barrier to the exercise of state authority.”);
see also HART & WECHSLER VII, supra note 1, at 503–09 & 509 n.6.
92 Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891
(2004).
93 Id. at 1924.
94 See id. at 1913 (citing Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2272, 2280 (2002) (reporting
that since 1994, there had been sixty-nine appellate decisions reviewing a judgment on
jurisdiction in such cases, of which forty-five had resulted in reversal).
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efficiency. Instead, the Holmes test95—that original federal-question jurisdiction should turn on the existence of a federally created cause of action—
would be preferable.
Since this article appeared, the Supreme Court, in the Grable decision,96
has opted for a more flexible approach than Dan advocated, but the Court
made clear, both in the Grable opinion and in later opinions, that most cases
in which a federal element was an aspect of a state law issue would not
“squeeze[ ] into the slim category Grable exemplifies.”97 Though the Court
has consistently adhered to its rejection of the Holmes test, I must concede
that the results and rationales of Grable and the decisions that followed it,
while falling somewhere between Dan’s views and mine, came closer to his.
Dan took account of the impact of Grable and the subsequent cases on
his own thesis in later editions of Hart and Wechsler. In Chapter VIII (on
the original federal-question jurisdiction of the district courts), Dan referred
to Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Grable (submitting to precedent but, after
citing Dan’s comments in an earlier version of Chapter VIII, expressing a
willingness to consider adoption of the Holmes test)98 and noted his own
continuing concern that the costs of a more flexible rule might outweigh the
benefits. But he acknowledged that Grable and its successors “could lead to a
more consistent understanding” of the scope of district court authority in
such cases.99
Once again, Dan’s work embodies his abiding concern that doctrine and
function be made as harmonious as possible, as well as his recognition that
even those who agree on this goal can reasonably disagree on how to get
there.
95 This test stems from Justice Holmes’s opinion for the Court in American Well Works
Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (“A suit arises under the law that creates
the cause of action.”), and was iterated in his dissent in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust
Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214–15 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But it seems to me that a suit
cannot be said to arise under any other law than that which creates the cause of action.”).
96 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005) (noting national interest in providing a federal forum for federal tax litigation is sufficiently
substantial to support the exercise of federal-question jurisdiction over the quiet title
action in state court).
97 Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 701 (2006); see also
Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). In Gunn, the Court, in holding that a federal
district court lacked jurisdiction over an action that involved a question of federal patent
law embedded in a state tort action for malpractice, id. at 1065, stated that the action failed
to meet a four-prong test: that the federal question is necessarily in dispute, that it is actually disputed, that it is substantial (i.e., important to the federal system as a whole), and that
it is capable of resolution without disruption of the federal-state balance embodied in the
relevant federal law. See id. at 1065–69.
98 Grable, 545 U.S. at 321–22 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing HART & WECHSLER V,
supra note 91, at 885–86).
99 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER VI, supra note 91, at 799–800. The Preface to the sixth
edition notes Dan’s responsibility for this chapter. See id. at viii.
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II. SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS
Twenty years have passed since I last wrote on this topic. In that time,
there have been several important decisions, and considerable scholarship,
most especially Dan’s insightful analyses and critiques. As a result, my own
thoughts have changed in several respects. And I have also felt the need to
do a better job of explaining and defending those positions I still adhere to.
So I am pleased to have an opportunity to do that, or as some academics
would prefer to say: “What I really meant was . . . .”
First, enlightened by Dan’s thoughts on the question, I believe that the
extent of the “arising under” appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
under Article III100 is very broad—broad enough to embrace any issue of
federal law that may have been decisive in the determination of a question of
state law by a state court. In this view, which may have been implicit in my
earlier article but was certainly not clearly stated, I disagree with Ronald
Greene.101 But I find strong support extending back to the Osborn case.102
The existence or nonexistence of a “good reason” for the exercise of that
jurisdiction is not controlling, just as (in my view) it is not controlling in
determining whether Article III grants authority to a federal court to exercise
federal diversity jurisdiction in a particular case.
Second, now that the choice of whether or not to accept a state court
decision for plenary review is left by statute entirely to the Supreme Court’s
discretion (i.e., the vote of four Justices under the rule-of-four tradition103), I
share what I believe to be the view Dan implied in his discussion: there is no
need to articulate a rule or principle to govern that selection in cases involving embedded federal questions. The Court’s self-interest in choosing—
from among the many thousands of petitions it receives each Term—the
fewer than 100 cases in which it will afford plenary review is more than sufficient to do the job of limiting plenary review to cases that are of significant
federal concern. Observers may be critical of particular choices made by the
Court on the ground that there was an insufficient basis for the choice
(whether to review or not to review), but that is likely to occur in any event.
Third, with respect to Standard Oil itself, I still believe—again in contrast
to Greene and perhaps here to Dan as well—that the decision fits within the
100 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
101 See supra notes 28–45 and accompanying text.
102 Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) (holding that original federal-question jurisdiction may be founded on the presence of a federal “ingredient”
in a state-created cause of action). While the decision in Osborn might have been based on
the presence of a substantial federal interest (in protecting the Bank against state interference), it was not. For a revealing insight into the Osborn rationale in the light of contemporary understandings, see Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Original Source of
the Cause of Action in Federal Courts: The Example of the Alien Tort Statute, 101 VA. L. REV. 609,
642 n.151 (2015).
103 For a history and analysis of the rule, see generally Joan Maisel Leiman, The Rule of
Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975 (1957). See also HART & WECHSLER VI, supra note 91, at
1470–75.
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broad authority delegated by Article III. Study of the state supreme court’s
opinion in the case shows that much of the (exclusively) federal case law
relied on by the state supreme court in determining that post exchanges
were not federal government instrumentalities consisted of lower court decisions challenging a state’s authority to tax.104 Thus, Dan’s probing question
about what federal law was involved105 has an answer: the definition that
would be used in determining whether the imposition of a state tax would
exceed state authority under the Constitution.
But was this a sound exercise of the Court’s authority to decide a question of federal law embedded in an issue of state law, without reaching the
federal constitutional question? Here, it is surely not irrelevant that at the
time there was an appeal as of right from the state court decision upholding
the application of the state statute against a constitutional challenge; the
Court may have wished, as it often does,106 to avoid deciding that question.
Moreover, even if (as is unlikely) California was the only state whose own law
exempted the federal government from tax, I remain obdurate in the view
that the threat of a burden on the federal fisc is a sufficient basis to warrant
giving the state court an opportunity to reconsider its own definition even if
the imposition of a tax would pass constitutional muster. Finally, if there is
widespread agreement that it is appropriate for the Court to review and correct a misunderstanding of federal law that may have led the state courts to
give a narrow construction to a state statute (as in Van Cott), there is surely a
respectable argument, at the very least, for reviewing and correcting a misunderstanding that may have given rise to a broad construction of a state statute.107 Nevertheless, I realize now, if I didn’t before, that in this view, I stand
on shaky ground.
On a matter of consequence that is collateral to the central focus of this
Essay, I now believe that I was too casual in suggesting only in a footnote a
possible difference between the appropriate measure of appellate and original jurisdiction.108 In determining original district court jurisdiction, I
would not revert to the rigid Holmes test,109 but I would and do support a
104 See Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 119 P.2d 329, 330–32 (Cal. 1941).
105 See supra text accompanying notes 87–92.
106 On the pros and cons of the familiar avoidance doctrine, see HART & WECHSLER VII,
supra note 1, at 79–81.
107 Indeed, the Court itself made a similar point, citing Standard Oil, in the Three Affiliated Tribes case. See supra note 91. As to the use of “may” in text, I rely on the Court’s
decision, in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), to employ a presumption of reviewability when confronted with a state court judgment that may have rested on a federal ground.
See id. at 1038 n.4 (“We may review a state case decided on a federal ground even if it is
clear that there was an available state ground for decision on which the state court could
properly have relied.” (citing Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 37 n.3 (1967) (per
curiam))).
108 See supra notes 53–66 and accompanying text.
109 “Revert” may not be the right word, since the research of Ann Woolhandler and
Michael G. Collins in Federal Question Jurisdiction and Justice Holmes, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2151 (2009), has demonstrated that in the nineteenth century, acceptance of federal juris-
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rule confining the exercise of district court jurisdiction to those few compelling cases (like Smith and Grable) where ultimate Supreme Court authority to
review is likely to be insufficient to protect the federal interest in the outcome. The rigorous standard laid down by the Court in 2013 in Gunn v.
Minton,110 even if a bit too confining for me, moves strongly towards the
goals of simplicity and predictability that Dan advocated, and assures that
district courts will not be overburdened.
Notably, this conclusion does not rest—for me or any member of the
Supreme Court (including, interestingly, Justice Thomas, who stated in his
Grable concurrence that, like Dan, he would consider adoption of the
Holmes test on essentially pragmatic grounds)—on the view that such a limitation is required by Article III or by the terms of the statutory grant of original federal-question jurisdiction. Indeed, that grant traces back to a
post–Civil War statute that was almost surely designed to extend the reach of
federal lower court jurisdiction as far as Article III permitted.111 Rather, it
rests on a view of the proper scope of judicial discretion to confine the exercise of judicial authority to hear a case on the merits. That discretion, as I
have argued before, is inherent in both the constitutional and statutory
grants of subject-matter jurisdiction, in the absence of a clear mandate to the
contrary.
***
The discussion of this interesting and important topic—here presented
only in part112—will surely continue.113 But Dan’s extraordinary insights,
wisdom, generous but stern critical eye, and joy in sharing ideas will be sorely
missed.

diction on the basis of a federal question embedded in a state law cause of action was far
more common than is generally believed.
110 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (“[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of
resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by
Congress.”).
111 See, e.g., James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions,
90 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 642–45 (1942) (examining legislative history of the Judiciary Act of
1875); Ray Forrester, The Nature of a “Federal Question”, 16 TUL. L. REV. 362, 374–85 (1942)
(discussing statutory meaning of “arising under” and analyzing subsequent case law).
112 I have not attempted a complete survey of the literature, since my purpose has been
to focus on the contributions of the many editions of Hart and Wechsler, and particularly
of Dan himself, and their influence on my own thinking.
113 As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016) (holding that a federal district court lacked
federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction over a removed state law action), considered
the interpretation and application of the standards laid down in Gunn v. Minton, see supra
note 110 and accompanying text.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL506.txt

1948

unknown

Seq: 18

notre dame law review

29-AUG-16

15:53

[vol. 91:5

